There are no right answers. Just do what you want and don’t think about it.
We’ve been thinking things were truly, horribly bad. But we were wrong. They were much worse.
I want an independent 9/11 investigation.
There’s too much discussion by, and evidence from, scientists, former intelligence people, etc.
Even people like me, who are reluctant to consider minority reports that contradict my government’s official findings, are forced at this point to be unable to accept the official report.
Given the questions that have been raised, especially in the last 2-3 years, an independent investigation, at the very least, is owed to true patriots of this country.
Stand by your promises of having an open administration, and allow your country’s own scientists to raise questions publicly. We’re at a point now where the public may not know what happened on 9/11…but we know that the official story is far from true.
If there is nothing to hide, then scientific inquiry is nothing for the U.S. to fear! In the absence of acknowledgment of the growing doubt in the scientific community of the 9/11 official story, many of us who would rather believe the official story and go on with our lives are forced instead to consider that fears beyond our worst fears may be true, about 9/11.
I don’t want to believe the minority report. Please help me be able to rationally believe the official reports by initiating an independent investigation into the events of 9/11.
I’m not smart enough to figure out what happened that day, but I am smart enough to know that the current official story does not add up.
“A time comes when silence is betrayal.” (Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr)
I’m not super-impressed with most of the minority theories of what happened on 9/11, but this paper raises questions that, while unanswered, require my reconsideration of the popular theory:
“We have discovered distinctive red/gray chips in all the samples we have studied of the dust produced by the destruction of the World Trade Center. … The red portion of these chips is found to be an unreacted thermitic material and highly energetic.”
Starting to see story as something that happens as a result of the writing (or telling) process. As opposed to telling being something you do to a story. A story is something that arises from the process of telling. So, if the question is: which comes first, the story or the telling? The answer is the telling.
Nietzsche said that one of the most critical things people get wrong in their thinking is the designation of cause and of effect. He said that one of the most pervasive flaws in people’s thinking is confusion about what is the cause and what is the effect.
It is hard to understand the nature of liking or of planning when we think that liking is the cause and planning is the effect. We make certain plans because of what we like, right? If we think that is the case, then planning and liking never seem to make sense. The reason is simply that we have the cause and the effect backwards. Planning causes liking. Liking happens as a result of planning and executing plans.
It’s the same with stories and telling. It’s impossible to understand what a story is while we hold on to the erroneous belief that a story is the cause and telling the effect. We will never understand story if we proceed that way. But when you see that telling is the cause and story its effect, then the nature of story becomes clear.
You can’t like without planning. You can’t have stories without telling. You can have planning without liking. You can have telling without stories. It may be counterintuitive, but the same is true of codebreakers and codes. You can’t have codes without codebreakers. You can have codebreakers without codes. (This last was pointed out to me in a cryptography history book whose name I don’t remember.)
If those statements seem not-right to you, it’s because you don’t understand what liking is, what stories are, or what codes are. If you think the statements are backwards, then you think that a code is a way to hide a message, that liking is a way of deciding what to do, and that telling is something that happens to a story that already exists. And if you think those things, then when you think about the dynamics of liking, stories, and codes, their dynamics will seem confusing.
When I say their dynamics will seem confusing, I mean that if you try to ask questions about them, the questions will tend to be hard to answer. Here are some example questions: Why do I like one thing and not another? What makes people’s likes and dislikes different? Why do I like anything at all? Is there any absolute, objective reason for liking something? What should I put in my story? Is this a complete story? Why do I respond to this story? Is there some absolute or objective reason that a particular story would exist? Those questions are hard to answer. To discuss them is to see the complexity of the dynamics of liking and story. The concepts of liking and story are hard to define. Their dynamics are complex enough to be confusing.
But they’re not confusing at all if you understand them as effects rather than causes. Liking is something that happens as a result of successfully executing plans. Stories are something that happen as a result of telling (or writing, or producing). Codes are something that happen as a result of people spying on you. You can’t have a code without having someone who is trying to read your messages. Without someone trying to decode your messages, your messages would not be codes. They would be open communication. If no one is trying to decode it, then a message’s encoding is meaningless. If no one writes anything, tells anything, or produces anything, then no stories result from those processes. If you never execute a plan, then you can never begin to like. Without executing a plan and observing your success or lack of success at doing that, you have no framework for knowing what to like and what not to. You have no framework for being able to like or dislike. Planning exists without liking. Executing a plan exists without liking. Telling exists without stories. Codebreakers exist without codes. Spies exist without secrets. Spies don’t need secrets in order to exist. But secrets can’t exist without spies! If there were no spies to spy on me, then I couldn’t make anything a secret. You can try to figure out secrets when there are none, but you can’t have secrets when there’s no one to keep them from. See? There could be a planet with one detective on it and no mysteries, but there couldn’t be a planet with one mystery and no detectives. A detective without a mystery is bored. A mystery without a detective is impossible.
True, there is a counterpartship between detectives/mysteries, codebreakers/codes, planning/liking, telling/stories wherein the first part of each of those pairs is more complete, more fully itself when the second is present. But a less-than-fully-actualized detective can still exist without a mystery, whereas even a less-than-fully-actualized mystery cannot exist without a detective. Consider DNA and the early stages of a living organism as an example in the case of planning/liking: an initial organism can clearly exist in a state characterized by a plan and the execution of that plan, without being characterized by liking or disliking. You can have an organism that meaningfully does planning and plan execution without doing any liking or disliking. But you can’t have an organism that meaningfully does liking or disliking without doing any plan execution. You can have an organism that does arbitrary liking or disliking without doing plan execution. But it’s not meaningful liking because part of the definition (and part of the [seeming] mystery) of liking is that it’s not completely arbitrary to the one who’s doing it.
Liking is inherent to planning, but planning isn’t inherent to liking. That is to say that the liking in an organism wherein liking came first and planning came as a result would be an arbitrary kind of liking. Because (due to the individual nature of liking) to define liking from outside the individual (or at the outset of the individual) would go against, would compromise the liking itself. Whereas to define planning and plan execution from outside the individual, to impart that initially from an outside source (or to define that at the outset), would not compromise the planning or plan execution, given the fact that having a plan and executing a plan (unlike having a preference) are not essentially individual traits. If what I like was defined by something other than me, then it’s not really a like in the truest sense of liking. Whereas if my plan and my method for executing that plan are defined by something other than me, they are plans just as truly as they would be plans if I came up with them myself.
If we understand liking, stories, and secrets not as the causes of, but rather as the effects of the acts of planning, telling, and spying, then the [previously apparently complex] dynamics of liking, stories and secrets are suddenly a lot easier to understand.
Compared to the dynamics of effects, the dynamics of causes are simple. When you ask questions about planning, telling, and spying, the discussion that results (while it may not be trivial) is a lot simpler than the discussion that results from questions about liking, stories, and secrets. Looking at that is one way to try to figure out which is the cause, and which is the effect.
I love looking at this. It makes clear the connection in my mind between what I hear and what I see. I cannot think in hearing. I can think in seeing. There’s been a little bit of work using cellular automata to compose music. Seeing this video sparks my thinking along those lines.